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‘How Many Frenchmen Did You Kill?’ British Bombing Policy Towards France, 1940–1945 
Lindsey Dodd and Andrew Knapp 
 
Between 1940 and 1945, Allied air forces dropped nearly 600,000 tons of bombs on France. 
The death toll, of perhaps 60,000 French civilians, is comparable to that of British victims of German 
bombing (51,500) plus V-weapon attacks (nearly 9,000).
1
 Yet the Allied bombing of France occupies a 
minor place in the literature. De Gaulle’s War Memoirs allow it the briefest of allusions.
2
 Histories of 
the Occupation concede it a few pages.3 Studies of bombing focus on Germany, briefly covering attacks 
on France in Spring 1944.
4
 Accounts of the Liberation focus on politics and on ground fighting, with 
bombing as a prelude and an accompaniment.
5
 The one full-length study of the subject, though 
comprehensive, is poorly sourced and sometimes unreliable.6 Not an untold story, the bombing of 
France is certainly an undertold one. 
 
This article aims to redress the balance partially, by analysing how the Allies chose to devote 
almost a quarter of their European bombing effort to France.
7
 First, it identifies the major 
stakeholders, and the fora and constraints within which they made policy. Second, it analyses the aims 
of bombing policy towards France. Finally, it examines how the British handled objections from Vichy 
and the Free French. 
Policy-making: actors and processes 
More than any other air force, the RAF had been developed from its foundation under Lord 
Trenchard as an independent service for bombing. Bombers dominated aircraft development 
  
programmes in the 1930s. Bomber Command’s Officer Commanding-in-Chief from February 1942, Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, saw the destruction of Germany’s industrial cities as the means to 
victory. Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff from 1940 to 1945, placed the strategic offensive 
against Germany at the heart of RAF strategy for most of the war. Attacking Germany, Bomber 
Command was executing a policy of which its leaders were forceful advocates.8 When the same 
aircraft attacked France, by contrast, Bomber Command was complying (sometimes unwillingly) with a 
strategy demanded and defined by others. 
The others were, firstly, the other services. The Admiralty wanted France attacked, as Germany’s 
forward base in the Battle of the Atlantic, from 1940. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary 
Force (SHAEF), under Eisenhower, sought air support in North-West Europe as it prepared for the 
Overlord landings. The bombers also faced demands from political authorities. The Ministry of 
Economic Warfare (MEW) pressed for precision attacks on industrial targets in occupied territories as 
well as Germany. The Political Warfare Executive (PWE) used two bomber squadrons to drop agents 
and material into France, which also attracted 45 per cent of its propaganda leaflets.9 In 1941–2, it also 
demanded raids against German-related targets in France to demonstrate Britain’s will to continue 
fighting. The Foreign Office, meanwhile, shared PWE’s perspective to a degree, but also worried about 
alienating the Vichy government, the Free French, or the wider population.  
These diverse, often conflicting, demands converged upon the RAF’s political masters in the Air 
Ministry, and particularly on its Secretary of State from 1940 to 1945, Sir Archibald Sinclair. Lacking 
Cabinet rank, and serving under a Prime Minister who was also an activist Defence Minister, Sinclair 
acted as a policy broker not a policy initiator, balancing competing claims to limited resources and 
acting as the RAF’s spokesman to Parliament and public.
10
 Sinclair also had to deal increasingly with the 
Americans, a consideration of direct relevance to France. All UK-based American raids until January 
1943 targeted occupied territory; their volume grew, even after raids on Germany began, over the 
next two years.
11
 
Bombing policy was made under many constraints. The first was the availability of aircraft and 
bombs. Bomber Command dropped 13,000 tons of bombs on all targets in 1940, 32,000 in 1941 and 
45,500 (plus the US 8th Air Force’s 1,561) in 1942. These two air forces then dropped over 200,000 
  
tons in 1943, and nearly 915,000 in 1944.
12
 Targeting priorities were still vigorously contested, but by 
1944 there were many more bombs for everyone, as both French and Germans found.  
Political pressures complemented material constraints. Bombing policy was occasionally a 
domestic political issue, especially in the difficult year from late 1941 to late 1942.
13
 France, 
meanwhile, was officially neutral under Vichy, half-occupied by the Axis, recently an ally, and home to 
an internal and external Resistance movement with which Britain maintained relations, however 
stormy. Inevitably, operations here entailed difficult political choices.  
Vichy broke off diplomatic relations with Britain in July 1940 but unofficial contacts persisted 
through embassies at Madrid and Washington. The danger that France’s fleet and colonial possessions, 
especially in North-West Africa, would fall into German hands constantly preoccupied Churchill; fear of 
pushing Vichy into Germany’s arms restrained bombing policy.14 So, for a time, did the United States. 
Like some 40 countries worldwide, Washington initially viewed Vichy as France’s legitimate 
government. Through its ambassador to Vichy, Admiral Leahy, the Roosevelt administration pursued 
positive engagement with Pétain’s régime even after America had entered the war; and Churchill had 
no wish to quarrel with Washington over France. Only Laval’s return to government in April 1942 
prompted an American reappraisal and Leahy’s recall.
15
  
Indeed, the Vichy and American constraints largely disappeared in 1942. American aircraft 
bombed French targets from 17 August. The Torch landings of 8 November won North-West Africa for 
the Allies and precipitated the German occupation of the zone libre, the scuttling of the French fleet in 
Toulon, and the final diplomatic break between Vichy and Washington. These developments left Vichy 
with no further cards to play. Henceforth the British advocated restraint more than the Americans. 
This was chiefly out of concern at the reaction to bombing of the French generally, and of the 
Resistance and Free French in particular. A traumatised, homeless, and hostile French population 
might hinder the Allies’ re-entry to Europe; an unfriendly post-war French government would damage 
Britain’s position on the continent. Such concerns, argued forcefully by the Foreign Office, frequently 
clashed with military priorities over a four-year-long debate. 
The debate developed in many fora.
16 
 The War Cabinet, Britain’s supreme policy-making body, 
inevitably delegated much business to committees. The most important was the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, which met nearly 2,400 times between 1940 and 1945.17 The Defence Committee, which 
  
included politicians as well as the service chiefs, met much less frequently. The Anti-U-Boat Committee 
played a crucial role, notably in relation to France’s ports, in the winter of 1942–3 before settling to 
more routine business as the North Atlantic crisis subsided.
18
 At a lower level, the Bomb Target 
Committee met fortnightly.
19
 And within this framework, the Chief of Air Staff and the head of Bomber 
Command retained considerable operational freedom. 
America’s entry into the war complicated these processes. Major strategic priorities were now 
fixed at summits, paralleled by the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff. After December 1943, 
the formation of SHAEF triggered a reconfiguration of air command structures in anticipation of 
Overlord. British and American tactical air forces, under Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, were 
integrated into the SHAEF structure; strategic air forces, under Harris and his American counterpart, 
General Carl Spaatz, remained outside it but at the disposal, from 14 April 1944, of Eisenhower and his 
British deputy, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder. From late May, a joint Bomber Operations Planning Staff 
managed operations over North-West Europe.
20
  
Policy emerged from these structures in the form of directives, approved (according to 
importance) by the Chiefs of Staff, the Defence Committee, or the War Cabinet, and outlining targets 
and priorities. In 1943, however, two wide-ranging directives – ‘Casablanca’ and ‘Pointblank’ – were 
issued by the Combined Chiefs to the two strategic air forces after conferences in January and May. 
Another major directive, crucial to the bombing of France, was issued on 17 April 1944 directly by 
SHAEF. Concurrently, however, the Air Ministry or the Air Staff also issued more limited directives to 
Bomber Command.21 
Directives were not the totality of bombing policy. They were drawn up, in principle, within the 
framework of general rules on bombing policy issued in June 1940 and October 1942. Major directives 
were always compromises, allowing ‘unlimited scope for our differences of interpretation’.22 
Operational conditions – the weather and the enemy – could prevent implementation; French targets 
were often detailed as to be attacked when bad weather prevented raids on Germany.
23
 Finally, raids 
on France, because of their political sensitivity, were often preceded by lengthy exchanges between 
Bomber Command, Portal, Sinclair, and even Churchill. The 1942 attack on the Schneider works at Le 
Creusot, for example, was suggested on 8 April, ordered in a directive dated 20 July, but only executed 
on 17 October.24 
  
Bombing policy towards France, therefore, was made by a broad range of participants, whose 
relative influence varied with the course of the war, and was subject, in principle, to tighter constraints 
than those applied to Germany.  
Bombing policy: general statements 
Unlike directives, the bombing policy statements of 31 May 1940 and 29 October 1942 defined rules of 
engagement rather than targets. That of 1940 was much the more restrictive. For all potential targets 
in enemy and enemy-occupied territory, it not only declared the ‘intentional bombardment of civil 
populations’ to be illegal, but also required that targets must be clearly identifiable, that care should 
be taken to avoid civilian casualties, and that Red Cross conventions be observed. A list of acceptable 
military targets followed, though the directive also specified as legitimate ‘other objectives, the 
destruction of which is an immediate military necessity’.25  
The Armistice of June 1940 raised the question of applying these rules to France, and arguments 
within the Air Ministry that summer reflected Britain’s ambiguous attitude to Vichy. 26 Sinclair’s initial 
memorandum on France, as accepted by the War Cabinet, was more restrictive than the statement of 
31 May: the list of legitimate targets was shorter and the zone libre off limits. Though accepting that 
military objectives in unoccupied France ‘should be destroyed’, the Cabinet refused British 
bombardment as a means to do so, optimistically preferring the idea of Gaullist sabotage.27  
The second general statement, dated 29 October 1942, formalised what had become a radical 
difference in policy towards enemy and enemy-occupied territories. In relation to Germany, the 
directives of 9 July 1941 and 14 February 1942 identified destroying civilian morale as an essential 
goal:
28
 the statement of 29 October 1942 argued that the enemy’s resort to ‘unrestricted air warfare’ 
justified the area bombing of Germany, Italy, and Japan. For occupied territory, on the other hand, the 
29 October statement reproduced much of the June/July 1940 policy. It reinforced provisions against 
civilian casualties, stating that ‘if any doubt exists as to the possibility of accurate bombing and if a 
large error would involve the risk of serious damage to a populated area, no attack is to be made’. Yet 
daytime raids on French railway locomotives and nocturnal attacks on all French trains were 
authorised: only Germans and ‘collaborationists’, it was assumed, could travel by night.
29
 The 
statement still applied only to Occupied France. In 1941, General Hastings Ismay, Military Secretary to 
  
the War Cabinet, had countered Portal’s proposal to attack the zone libre by stating that unoccupied 
France was ‘in certain senses a neutral country’.30 A year later, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden’s 
recommendation of no change until Pétain was ‘behaving much worse than he is at present’ was still 
the consensus.
31
 However, the Germans’ move into the southern zone on 11 November led, within 
weeks, to raids here too. And as we shall see, operational requirements could override the general 
policy statements. 
The Evolution of Policy, 1940–45 
Thirty-two major directives issued between 4 July 1940 and 14 September 1944 – the approximate 
period of the Occupation – are reprinted in the Official History. Of these, 21 concern France directly. 
Their main objectives can be considered under nine headings (Table 1).32 
Preventing a German invasion of the UK was a primary objective of bombing policy from June 
1940, and a secondary one into 1941. Main targets were German shipping and barges in ports from 
Calais to Le Havre, and Luftwaffe airfields in France. The Channel ports were heavily attacked on 7 
September 1940, when invasion was considered imminent.33 Coastal barges were easy targets and 
these raids succeeded. But Bomber Command could still muster only limited forces: some attacks on 
airfields were undertaken by single unescorted Blenheims.34 The French General Staff’s post-war 
survey indicated 292 French dead in Allied raids in 1940.35 
Offering operational experience to new aircrews was an explicit aim of the directive of 30 October 
1940.36 Trenchard referred to the Channel Ports as ‘a bombing range’, offering ‘good practice for our 
pilots before they bombed Germany’.37 ‘Freshman’ crews were used against Dutch, Belgian, and French 
Channel ports in 1942; Harris sent training units to non-German targets in 1943.
38
 The US 8th Air Force 
– all freshmen at the start – chose France, a relatively undefended target, for 52 per cent of its first 
year’s sorties.39 
Drawing Luftwaffe fighters from other fronts was a primary bombing aim in the Directive of 5 May 
1942. These ‘circus’ operations, typically involving between 20 and 40 (usually medium) bombers with 
fighter escort, had been run over northern France since January 1941. Portal presented them as one of 
the Allies’ rare means to ‘help the Russians’. Halted in Winter 1941–2, scaled back after heavy RAF 
  
losses from June 1942, these operations still exposed targets from Rotterdam to Caen to repeated low-
intensity bombardment.40 
German warships in French ports appeared in directives at the beginning and end of 1941. 
Between December 1940 and June 1941, two heavy cruisers (Hipper and Prinz Eugen) and the 
battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, docked at Brest; and between January 1941 and February 
1942 Brest received 25 major raids (of over 50 bombers) and numerous smaller ones.
41
 In Winter 
1941–2, indeed, an unwilling Bomber Command devoted a third of its sorties to Brest.
42
 In one sense 
the raids worked: none of the vessels emerged to attack an Atlantic convoy, and their escape up the 
Channel, on 12 February 1942, removed them as a threat. But all damage to them was done, unknown 
to the British, before August 1941; subsequent raids merely destroyed lives and property in Brest. No 
big German surface warships ever returned to France. But the presence of smaller vessels, Axis 
merchant shipping, and submarines, attracted continued raids on French ports. 
The destruction of French factories working for Germany was a major aim in three directives of 
1942, and a lesser priority (at least relatively) thereafter. In part, such attacks aimed simply to disrupt 
German war production in France. But they were also seen as benefiting the Allies’ political standing in 
Europe. When Eden wrote to Sinclair, in April 1942, of the ‘bracing effect on French morale’ of raids on 
factories in France, adding that ‘our allies in every occupied territory are crying out for similar raids’, he 
reflected a consensus among Britain’s military and political leaders.
43
 Later that year, Sinclair viewed 
the Gien tank park as a second-rate target because it was preferable, for psychological reasons, ‘to 
attack objectives near large towns’.44 The directive of 25 May 1942 specifically sought to ‘give 
substance to the policy of the Political Warfare Executive which aims at discouraging the nationals of 
enemy occupied countries from working in German-controlled factories’.
45
 Discouragement was also 
aimed at factory owners or managers working or considering working with the Germans: some, 
indeed, were persuaded by the Resistance to help sabotage their own plants to avoid raids.
46
 Air raids 
as propaganda largely disappeared from the agenda after 1942, however. Torch, El Alamein, and 
Stalingrad offered clearer proof of Allied credibility; and bombing could readily have a negative as well 
as a positive propaganda value. 
The political risks were readily understood. These were not self-evidently military targets and 
some civilian casualties were inevitable. Attacks were planned with corresponding circumspection. 
  
When Sinclair sought approval for the night bombing of four key factories in November 1941, the War 
Cabinet deferred the decision for a month.47 It did so again in December, citing ‘the recent PETAIN-
GOERING conversations’ as a reason: ‘if fuller collaboration is in fact hanging in the balance these 
attacks might weigh it against us.’
48
 Approval was given after Christmas, when the Pétain-Goering talks 
had proved inconclusive.49 Then American efforts to limit Axis use of Vichy’s colonial territories stalled 
bombing plans again. In the Foreign Office, Cavendish-Bentinck minuted the potential dangers to 
relations with the State Department. Raids should neither push France further towards Germany nor 
provoke a quarrel with Britain’s new and powerful ally.50 
Ideal industrial targets were big, visible and clearly linked to Germany. They included Renault’s 
Boulogne-Billancourt plant, Matford-Ford at Poissy, the Gnôme-Rhône aero-engine works at 
Gennevilliers, and the Villacoublay aircraft works.51 Other targets, such as Citröen’s Quai de Javel plant 
in Paris, the Schneider works at Le Creusot and Gnôme-Rhône at Le Mans, followed. Operational 
instructions also aimed to minimise civilian casualties: the directive of 25 May 1942 stressed good 
weather, clear visibility, and experienced crews. Night operations were normally restricted to military 
targets distant from civilian dwellings.
52
 Moreover, individual raids were discussed, sometimes at 
length, by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Defence Committee, and the War Cabinet, and could still 
be put off for political reasons.53 Finally, attacks were preceded, in principle, by warnings, and followed 
by propaganda leaflets, stressing that the factories concerned had worked for Germany.
54
 
In these respects, the first big raid, against Renault on 3/4 March 1942, appeared perfect. Harris 
calls it ‘the first attack in which the principle of concentration in time and space was effectively 
employed’; the brand-new Gee navigational aid, plus clear moonlight, enabled 235 aircraft to bomb 
accurately at low level. He added that daylight attacks in France were also possible against the weak 
German defences, though ‘we were often able to attack by night with equal precision’.55 But the 
Renault raid still killed over 370 civilians – more than in any raid hitherto on Germany. The French 
service of the BBC deplored the lack of adequate warning.
56
 The raid did less damage than initially 
thought; Renault was revisited by the US 8th Air Force three times in 1943.57 Attacks on Gennevilliers, 
Poissy, and Le Creusot later in 1942 established that Bomber Command’s inaccuracy could leave 
industrial targets barely damaged while demolishing nearby workers’ housing.
58
 Periodic raids on 
French industry nevertheless continued, and were reinforced under the Pointblank directive of June 
  
1943. Accuracy improved in 1944, and that was marked by a number of daring precision raids on 
French industrial targets.59  
U-boat bases in France were a regular target from 1941 to 1943. They appear in nine directives, in 
four as a major objective. The attacks of early 1943, moreover, provide a striking contrast with the 
previous year’s political caution towards industrial targets. U-boats, after all, had the potential to 
defeat Britain. By the end of 1940, they occupied bases at Brest, Lorient, La Pallice (near La Rochelle), 
Bordeaux and St-Nazaire.
60
 The Admiralty requested heavy raids on these bases in October 1941. 
Bomber Command, however, absorbed with surface warships in Brest, missed the opportunity to 
bomb the concrete U-boat pens then under construction, The pens proved indestructible by existing 
bombs after their completion in Spring 1942.
61
  
Nevertheless, the Biscay bases returned to the agenda late that year, when the U-boats appeared 
to be winning at a time when America’s entry into the war was multiplying both transatlantic traffic 
and American concerns at shipping losses.
62
 Losses of British, Allied and neutral merchant shipping, 
roughly stable at 3.9 million tons in 1940 and 4.2 million in 1941, nearly doubled to 7.7 million tons in 
1942.
63
 The new anti-U-boat Committee met for the first time to address the threat on 13 November; 
it discussed the Biscay ports four times before the year’s end.  
These meetings, and the War Cabinet decision that followed them in January, marked an 
extraordinary departure from the policy statement of 29 October 1942. Churchill blocked raids on the 
ports on 13 November on political grounds, but cautiously authorised moonlight raids on the ports 
after the 18 November meeting. ‘Need for accuracy’, said Bomber Command’s orders the next day, ‘is 
stressed not only to ensure effective attack but also because of desirability on political grounds to 
avoid undue civilian casualties’. But on 9 December, the Committee considered area bombing raids 
against the ports. Eden’s reaction was hostile: although ‘the French react well to precision bombing of 
military objectives’, he argued, ‘any apparently unnecessary slaughter of French civilians would almost 
certainly have a bad effect among the Fighting French and in North Africa, apart from the harm it 
would do us with public opinion in France both during and after the war’. Sinclair and the Air Staff, 
sceptical about the effectiveness of the enterprise, backed Eden, and the Committee’s meeting of 23 
December was deadlocked. But when the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, put his proposal to the War 
Cabinet with Churchill’s authorisation on 11 January 1943, his assessment of the U-boat threat, and his 
  
proposed remedy – American ‘precision’ bombing by day and British area bombing by night – he 
convinced even Eden. General warnings to civilians to leave coastal areas were agreed, but anything 
more specific was refused for the aircrews’ safety.  
Instructions for area bombing of the Biscay ports, with a pause to assess results after Lorient, 
were issued to Bomber Command on 14 January; an Air Ministry telegram of the same day specified 
that ‘the CinC is at liberty to choose any aiming point even if the resultant bombing causes complete 
devastation of the inhabited areas of the town’.
64
 This was the only explicit instruction of the war to 
undertake area bombing against France. The general policy statement of 29 October 1942, then, was 
discarded when Britain faced an immediate danger which it was believed unrestricted bombing could 
overcome. The removal, with the Torch landings, of diplomatic constraints linked to Vichy may also 
explain the willingness to embrace area bombing. Between them, Bomber Command and the US 8th 
Air Force dropped 9,133 tons of bombs on the Biscay ports from January to May 1943.
65
 One Bomber 
Command attack on Lorient delivered over 1,000 tons on a single target for the first time in any one 
raid of the war.66  
Subsequent reconnaissance over Lorient showed a wrecked town and intact submarine pens. By 
10 March, Pound’s best claim for the bombing was that it had prevented three U-boat cruises; over 
240 U-boats were operational at the time. Invited by Churchill to comment on the Biscay offensive, 
Harris wrote that the Admiralty’s requirements would absorb Bomber Command’s entire efforts for at 
least two months and entail the complete destruction of Bordeaux and La Rochelle; moreover, ‘The 
futility of the policy suggested is demonstrated by the fact that Lorient, on which 4,000 tons of bombs 
have been dropped, still heads the list of precision targets for day bombing’. These views, expounded 
to the Committee on 31 March, led to the discontinuation of major raids on Biscay ports, but did not 
prevent the US 8th Air Force from flying over 900 sorties against the Biscay ports in the next six 
months.
67
 The last attacks on the Biscay bases, in August 1944, penetrated some shelters with the new 
12,000lb ‘Tallboy’ bombs. By that time, the Battle of the Atlantic had been largely won, not by 
bombing submarine bases, but by coastal mining and airborne attacks on U-boats at sea, the fruit of 
improved technology and a modest diversion of aircraft from Bomber to Coastal Command.
68
  
German V-weapons based in France also threatened Britain directly, though less severely than U-
boats. V-1 sites, codenamed ‘Crossbow’, appeared in three directives in 1944, twice as a major 
  
objective, and attracted heavy attacks on northern France from December 1943 until its liberation late 
in August 1944. With sites located in the countryside, the risk of civilian casualties and consequent 
political fallout raised few concerns.
69
 But Crossbow sites were small, quickly installed, widely 
dispersed, and easily simulated as dummies. In the cloudy summer of 1944, they taxed even the skills 
of 617 squadron.70 Less virtuoso formations typically churned up fields and orchards around the sites, 
damaging access to the targets. V-weapon sites, chiefly in France, took 117,256 tons of bombs from 5 
December 1943 to 3 September 1944, roughly one fifth of the total Allied tonnage dropped on French 
targets; for Tedder, the policy amounted to using a ‘sledgehammer for a tintack’. But attacks, in 
particular, on the larger supply sites significantly curbed the V-1 offensive on Britain.
71
 
The rail system of northern France was the central objective of Allied bombing in the spring of 
1944, appearing in a British directive of 4 March and, above all, in the SHAEF directive of 17 April. 
Opposed by an unholy alliance between airmen wanting to continue bombing Germany and politicians 
worried about civilian casualties, it generated fierce debate, both in the Defence Committee on 5, 13, 
19, and 26 April, and 3 May, and at War Cabinet meetings, on 3 and 27 April and 2 May.72 The outcome 
was not only the bombing of French towns on an unprecedented scale but also the transfer of 
bombing policy from the political authorities to SHAEF. 
Rail targets had been attacked since early in the war, with 419 raids in the four months to 31 
January 1943; the question of legitimate targets had been warmly debated.
73
 The policy of 1944, 
however, was altogether more systematic. It aimed to wreck rail centres – above all repair facilities – 
ensuring that tactical raids could then durably disrupt enemy communications and stall German 
reinforcements in the crucial days after the Normandy landings. The Overlord command team that 
assembled in London in December 1943 – Eisenhower as Commander-in-Chief, Tedder as his deputy, 
and Solly Zuckerman as scientific adviser – chose for France the strategy they had pursued together, 
with some success, in the Mediterranean
74
; by late January 1944 Zuckerman had prepared proposals 
involving some 79 ‘nodal points’ on French and Belgian railways.  
There followed two successive policy debates, the first wholly military, the second largely political. 
In the military debate Tedder, the leading advocate of what became the ‘Transportation Plan’, faced 
objections from both bomber chiefs. Harris claimed that Bomber Command would not achieve 
sufficient accuracy, and that the plan was a pointless diversion from the strategic offensive against 
  
Germany; Spaatz sought a concentration on German oil targets. Harris’s predictions about accuracy 
were confounded by experimental raids, authorised by Portal, on marshalling yards at Trappes and Le 
Mans early in March.
75
 Both Portal and Leigh-Mallory now backed Tedder. At the crucial military 
meeting of 25 March, Spaatz conceded that oil raids would have little immediate effect, while 
advocates of smaller, later, tactical raids on French targets were reassured that the Transportation 
Plan included their priorities. Two days later, the Combined Chiefs agreed to place tactical and 
strategic air forces under Eisenhower’s overall control; and Tedder was briefed to write the SHAEF 
directive of 17 April.76  
The political debate opened with memos to Churchill, from Portal and Ismay, warning of ‘between 
80,000 and 160,000 [civilian] casualties … of which a quarter would be killed’.
77
 At the Defence 
Committee and War Cabinet discussions, the plan’s supporters (Tedder, Portal, and on one occasion 
Zuckerman) faced opposition from an aggressively sceptical Churchill, who doubted the military 
benefits of ‘slaughtering’ French civilians and feared a consequent ‘unhealable breach’ between France 
and its Atlantic allies; from all the politicians on the Defence Committee bar Sinclair; and from military 
members including the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Alan Brooke, and Sidney Bufton, Director 
of Bombing Operations. Eden, in particular, cited the RAF’s reputation on the continent, the need to 
retain the co-operation of rail workers in sabotage operations, and above all the potential damage of 
difficult post-war Anglo-French relations ‘in a Europe that was already looking more to Russia than we 
would wish’. He also argued that the French might accept civilian casualties ‘in the heat of battle’, but 
not as part of a calculated plan, inviting ‘propaganda which suggested that while Russian armies 
defeated the enemy armies in the east, the British and Americans confined their efforts to killing 
French women and children’.
78
 
Six factors overcame the objections. The first was inertia. The raids started anyway in March, and 
by the Defence Committee meeting of 26 April, the plan was two-fifths complete, with 32 out of the 79 
targets hit and 26,000 tons of bombs dropped. A week earlier, Brooke had switched to supporting it 
rather than change plan barely six weeks before D-Day. Secondly, the casualty estimates were 
lowered, chiefly on the basis that the bomb weight needed for the programme had been exaggerated. 
These lower estimates were then, broadly, confirmed on the ground. At the Defence Committee of 3 
May Tedder claimed, with 3,000–4,000 deaths so far, that the total could come within the ceiling of 
  
10,000 proposed by Churchill. Third, intelligence summaries did not suggest that the French were 
turning decisively against their future liberators. Fourth, Tedder agreed to limit the programme to 
localities where 100 deaths or fewer could be expected. Fifth, an appeal from the War Cabinet to 
Eisenhower produced a letter on 2 May, drafted by Tedder, stating unambiguously that the success of 
D-Day depended on the Plan. Finally, when Churchill turned to Roosevelt as final arbiter, the President 
gave Eisenhower his full backing.
79
  
Between 3 March and 5 June 1944, the Allied air forces dropped 63,635 tons of bombs on 
Transportation targets. Bomber Command’s 40,930 tons represented 40 per cent of its effort over the 
period.
80
 The demands both of deception over the invasion area and of ‘interdiction in depth’ meant 
that targets extended beyond Normandy to the Loire, the Paris region, and northwards into Belgium.
81
 
By late May, with rail capacity virtually halved, almost nothing but German military supplies moved by 
train across northern France. Troops had to detrain in the Paris region, or even at Metz; Allied air 
superiority in Normandy then prevented any daytime troop movements by road.
82
 The post-D-day 
follow-up to the Transportation Plan by medium bombers and fighter-bombers, though hampered by 
bad weather, was often more economical than the heavy attacks, and helped ensure a steady 
deterioration in the Germans’ supply position through July and August.
83
 
Despite the successes achieved in the experimental raids of March,84 inaccurate bombing 
persisted, and casualties certainly exceeded the 100 on any single target hoped for by the War Cabinet. 
On 18 April, according to Florentin, Bomber Command killed 1,500 civilians in three raids, on Juvisy, 
Noisy-le-Sec, and Rouen.85 But Churchill’s figure of 10,000 was probably not exceeded by much: 
Florentin’s accounts of separate raids, including Lyon and St-Étienne but excluding targets further 
south, come to just below 11,000.
86
 Churchill followed developments closely, sending Tedder one-line 
memoranda with questions such as ‘How does your score stand now?’ On 23 May, Tedder declared 
6,062 deaths on Axis estimates (which he presumed were high, for propaganda reasons), adding that 
his ‘credit balance’ now stood at 3,938. A week later, after an intense Whitsun weekend of bombing, 
the Axis figures stood at 10,776. Churchill’s last memorandum of the kind, asking ‘How many 
Frenchmen did you kill?’ is dated 10 July, by which time Tedder’s estimate had fallen below 10,000.
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The Transportation Plan discussions were the climax of the debate over bombing policy towards 
France because they concentrated concerns raised earlier but less systematically: the difficulty of 
  
accurate bombing, the respective merits of bombing German and other targets, and the humanitarian 
and political objections to killing French civilians. After May 1944, the debate was closed, and control 
over bombing policy passed to SHAEF. The Defence Committee, scene of the fiercest arguments, met 
just twice more during the European war, on 20 July 1944 and 26 January 1945. But both the V-
weapon threat and the need to support ground operations ensured that raids on France were far from 
over. 
Support for ground forces, prepared by the Transportation Plan, took many forms: attacks on 
airfields, ammunition or fuel dumps, coastal batteries, radar stations, or transport targets, but also 
direct attacks on enemy positions in Normandy and, in August, in southern France.
88
 Indeed, Allied 
bombing on French territory peaked in the three months after D-Day.
89
 Conscious of the risks, 
Eisenhower signed a formal instruction to the bomber chiefs on 2 June stressing the need to minimise 
civilian casualties.
90
 
Three types of attack deserve particular attention. First, villages and small towns situated at cross-
roads, so-called ‘choke points’, were bombed just before and after D-Day. Opposed by Tedder, but 
demanded by the army commanders and agreed by Leigh-Mallory, these raids did little to slow 
German reinforcements.
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 They also wrecked towns such as Lisieux, Vire, or Évrecy, with high civilian 
casualties.92 Secondly, six major Allied ground attacks in Normandy used heavy bomber support. At 
Saint-Lô, bombing materially assisted the American break-out, though at the price of some casualties 
among US soldiers.
93
 By contrast, the bombing of Caen and its suburbs in operations Charnwood and 
Goodwood, on 7–9 and 18–21 July, killed some 2,000 of Caen’s residents and actually hindered the 
British advance by destroying and cratering large urban areas.
94
 Thirdly, heavy bombers attacked 
German ‘fortresses’ (Festungen) established in ports, to prevent long sieges and delays to the Allied 
advance. Their effectiveness in this role was mostly limited.95 Bomber Command’s September raids on 
Le Havre, for example, wrecked most of the city centre, killed over 1,500 civilians, but made little 
impact – less than the concurrent artillery bombardment – on German ground defences or coastal 
batteries.96  
The battle for France also saw sustained and effective ground support by the tactical air forces. 
The three types of attack above are highlighted, however, partly because they illustrate how bombing 
policy had escaped political control by June 1944. Between commanders, it remained controversial: 
  
Leigh-Mallory favoured unrestricted use of heavy bombers in ground support, Tedder was sceptical, 
and the bomber chiefs wanted to return to Germany.97 Political intervention however, had vanished 
from the debate. Raids of the scope of those on Caen or Le Havre, which would formerly have required 
Cabinet approval, were now decided within SHAEF. Tedder’s reply to Churchill’s note of 10 July 
expressed the fear that casualties in Caen and elsewhere would ‘dwarf’ the death toll of 10,000 from 
the Transportation Plan.
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 But Churchill did not follow it up. The destruction of Le Havre was reported, 
to SHAEF and to Cabinet, as a routine operation alongside attacks on German targets.
99
 Only the most 
obvious mistakes, such as raids undertaken in error on Royan and Calais in 1945, prompted open 
expressions of concern.
100
  
This withdrawal of political control can be explained in two ways. First, civilian casualties were 
viewed as more acceptable in the ‘heat of battle’: as Churchill observed to Roosevelt, after D-Day, 
‘when British and United States troops will probably be losing at a much higher rate, a new proportion 
establishes itself in men’s minds’.
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 Secondly, Allied political agents in France discerned sullenness 
among civilians but little of the ‘hatred’ for the Western Allies, or of a surge in support for Russia at the 
West’s expense, feared by Churchill and Eden.
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 The strictly political objections to unrestricted 
bombing had disappeared. Nor were the concerns of the Free French expressed forcefully enough to 
have any significant effect on the policy. 
Dealing with the French 
The only available French responses to their ordeal were verbal. Complaints reached London from 
both Vichy and the Free French. This section compares the treatment of complaints from the two 
sources. 
Vichy responded to air raids both via anti-Allied propaganda and through protests, addressed 
through a variety of channels. Equally, British reactions to Vichy included positive welcome, concern, 
indifference, irritation, riposte, and (very occasionally) concessions.  
The British welcomed Vichy propaganda that linked Allied raids with the Resistance. In June 1942, 
for example, Paul Marion, Vichy’s Secretary of State for Information, compared the ‘cowardly blows’ of 
recent raids on the Paris suburbs to attacks on German soldiers and collaborators by Communist 
résistants or ‘professional terrorists’.103 Marion echoed Pétain, and the Vichy press, in condemning the 
  
‘criminal aggression of a former ally’. But Harold Balfour, Sinclair’s Under-Secretary, argued that his 
speech ‘plays into our hands’ by emphasising a community of aim between British raids and French 
résistants, whether Communist or not.
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The British were more worried by German propaganda in France. One film, distributed widely 
after the Renault raid, showed ‘death and destruction; nauseating to a degree’, provoked ‘anti British 
cries’ from audiences, and according to Alvary Gascoigne, the British Consul in Tangier, did ‘more harm 
to Anglo-French relations than any other propaganda as yet conceived by the Germans’.
105
 German 
propaganda, however, would stop neither bombing nor civilian deaths: Sir Alexander Cadogan, 
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, stated that the ‘environs of Paris are no more 
sacrosanct than Brest, Boulogne and other places’.
106
 But counter-propaganda was needed, and 
supplied, to show damage to plant instead of people.107 
Vichy’s complaints, as opposed to propaganda, could lead to genuine uncertainty in the British 
camp. In Spring 1941 Fernand de Brinon, Vichy’s representative in Paris, protested against the bombing 
of Lorient and of Brest, where a hospital was hit. William Mack, of the French desk at the Foreign 
Office, instructed the Ministry of Information to blame the Germans for using the Brest hospital as a 
human shield for a military objective. The MOI demurred, arguing that any answer involves some 
admission of error or guilt. The French desk insisted, nevertheless, on deflecting blame onto the 
Germans to ‘score a propaganda point’; and a statement was issued over the MOI’s objections.
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Complaints believed to originate with Germany were dismissed by the Foreign Office. Both the 
mayor of Dieppe and the municipal council of Le Havre protested (the former via Madrid diplomatic 
channels) in 1941 at bombs falling on residential areas. Mack thought it ‘preferable to ignore this 
protest’ in both cases. The Vichy government’s backing for the complaints was uncertain, and the 
Foreign Office suspected ‘a German or German-inspired plan to get the local authorities in occupied 
France’ to protest.
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By contrast, top-level complaints from Vichy were taken more seriously. Thus a formal Vichy 
government protest (via Madrid) at damage to life and property through high-altitude attacks on Lille 
and Brest was discussed at the War Cabinet on 25 August. Churchill remarked that Vichy had made no 
complaint of principle against the RAF bombing objectives in occupied France, only against inaccurate 
bombing that hit civilians; other ministers observed that Vichy seemed not to object to attacks on the 
  
German war machine. The Cabinet decided that pilots attacking occupied territory should be instructed 
not to bomb if accuracy was in doubt; these instructions would reappear in the bombing policy 
statement of October 1942.
110
 Piétri, Vichy’s ambassador in Madrid, received a telegram expressing 
regret for the loss of life, and emphasising the care which pilots took.
111
 This complaint, therefore, 
reached Cabinet, elicited a sympathetic response and even prompted an adjustment – on paper at 
least – in policy. 
Vichy complaints channelled through Washington, on the other hand, could irritate the British, 
especially in the eleven months between Pearl Harbor and Torch. Vichy’s Ambassador in Washington, 
Gaston Henry-Haye, complemented his complaints to US Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles 
about the Renault bombing with a press conference. This combination worried Eden, who feared that 
neutral opinion would believe that ‘[Henry-Haye’s] statements find a certain sympathy in United States 
official circles’. He therefore instructed Britain’s ambassador to Washington, Lord Halifax, to inform 
Welles of his view that Henry-Haye’s ‘statements to the Press are harmful and only to the benefit of 
the Axis’.112 Welles listened: when Henry-Haye protested at Allied overflights of unoccupied French 
airspace in October 1942, he remarked that it was ‘utterly preposterous for France to hide behind the 
terms of the Armistice and at the same time claim the privileges of a neutral’. The British nevertheless 
investigated even this complaint, concerned about violations of Vichy neutrality, though they found no 
evidence of RAF involvement.
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Given its poor relations with Vichy, it was unremarkable that the British government should brush 
most of its complaints aside. Yet such consideration as was given suggests that Vichy maintained some 
bargaining power before November 1942. Torch changed that. By the spring of 1944, leaked Vichy 
prefects’ reports claiming that bombing was alienating French opinion from the Allies were discounted 
as biased by the British.114 
How did the British government treat representations on bombing policy from forces opposed to 
Vichy? To one type of message they proved highly receptive. In July 1941 the British legation in Berne 
forwarded a memorandum from ‘a friend in the French Embassy’ claiming that British bombing of 
industry would deter French business from collaborating with Germany. Citing this among other 
messages, Sinclair argued to the War Cabinet in November that ‘Frenchmen have repeatedly asked us 
  
to bomb French factories working for Germany’.
115
 More frequently, however, the internal Resistance 
and the Free French complained, less about the principle than about the inaccuracy of bombing. 
On 16 April 1943, for example, René Massigli, foreign affairs spokesman for the Comité Français 
de Libération Nationale, protested to Eden about US high-altitude raids on France, expressing fear of 
growing anti-American feeling. He suggested limiting these attacks to unpopulated areas, and ‘teaching 
our American friends some British methods’.
116
 Eden brought the issue to Cabinet on 19 April and, 
when informed that the USAAF would henceforth attack only submarine bases, pressed Sinclair for still 
tighter constraints on US operations.117 However, before Massigli was informed of the decision, policy 
had again changed. To restrict USAAF activities even this far would mean abandoning a campaign 
against railways in France. Accordingly, a list of French targets would be compiled for War Cabinet 
approval and – a minor concession – the USAAF would ‘attempt to reduce the danger to the 
population through suitable choice of target’.
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This policy was itself overtaken by the ‘Pointblank’ directive of May 1943, apparently without 
Eden’s full realisation. He complained twice to Sinclair, on 30 September and 7 October 1943, about 
casualties during recent US raids on Paris, which he believed breached agreed restrictions on USAAF 
operations and could provoke Vichy or German propaganda to rouse ‘mass indignation against the 
Americans and ourselves or against the Americans in contrast to ourselves’. Making Massigli’s 
complaint effectively his own, he demanded an impact assessment of US 8th Air Force attacks and 
‘high level representations to Washington’.
119
 Sinclair, however, reminded him that agreed Pointblank 
targets, overriding earlier restrictions, included Luftwaffe and aircraft industry centres in occupied 
territories.
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 Meanwhile, Sinclair’s secretary, the young Reginald Maudling, produced a detailed, 
upbeat, survey of recent American raids on occupied territories in order to ‘repel any further 
attacks’.121 Eden backed down; his support for a restrictive policy, inspired by Massigli, came second to 
military necessity defined by the Combined Chiefs. 
A letter that October to Eisenhower from General Giraud, still officially the military head of the 
CFLN, had no more practical effect than Massigli. Giraud wrote that the French people applauded 
Allied destruction of industrial plants on French soil, and praised the air crews’ bravery, but warned 
that ‘on French territory some [raids] cost more than the results they yield are worth’, in terms of 
damage to lives and property.122 Suggesting a response from the Air Ministry, William Mackenzie 
  
argued that Giraud had ‘approached a very difficult problem in a helpful and realistic spirit, and that he 
is entitled to a fairly full reply’.123 Mackenzie’s draft in this vein, respectful of Giraud’s military 
expertise, was not sent. Instead, the Chiefs of Staff composed a ‘soothing reply’ in late November 
expressing regret and acknowledging ‘the fortitude of the French nation’, but no more.
124
 No practical 
measures ensued. 
Free French protests reached a climax as the Allies debated the Transportation Plan. Three 
separate Free French documents reached London from Algiers in April/May 1944: a memorandum 
from Massigli handed to Alfred Duff Cooper (British representative with the CFLN in Algiers) on 5 April; 
a brochure on Allied bombing and its effects on French morale, dated 25 April; and a detailed survey of 
the same issue dated 17 May.
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 Their messages were consistent with one another and (broadly) with 
the Foreign Office view: the French supported precision attacks on legitimate targets but deplored 
apparently indiscriminate high-altitude bombing; the association of the latter with the USAAF damaged 
the Americans’ standing with the French; the use of delayed-action bombs was universally 
condemned; Vichy propaganda was being handed golden opportunities; and sabotage could produce 
better results with fewer casualties. Massigli also requested Free French involvement in the choice of 
targets, prompting a favourable response from the Foreign Office, which pointed out the ‘advantage to 
us if the French Committee could be induced to share the responsibility’ for target selection.126 
Although French civilian casualties were central to political debates on the Transportation Plan 
these French interventions had little, if any, effect on policy. Four reasons can be suggested. The first 
was timing: the two long analyses of bombing and public opinion (though not Massigli’s earlier 
memorandum) reached London after the essential issues had been decided. Secondly, the CFLN’s 
military representatives in London appeared not to share the Algiers perspective. General Koenig, the 
CFLN’s representative to SHAEF since March, told Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff Walter Bedell Smith that 
‘we would take twice the losses to be rid of the Germans’; two days later, Air Marshal Vallin, 
Commander of Free French air forces in Britain (which had participated in some raids on France), 
broadcast a vigorous message of support for the raids in opposition to a recent appeal against them 
from French Cardinals.
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 That the CFLN spoke with more than one voice allowed the Allies to choose. 
Thirdly, as M.R.D. Foot has observed, although sabotage used fewer explosives and killed fewer people 
than bombing, it could not be organised systematically from London, whereas a bombing raid could be 
  
ordered, executed, and assessed by SHAEF within hours. Sabotage might complement bombing; it 
could not replace it.128 French involvement in targeting, finally, was raised by Churchill with Roosevelt 
on 7 May, but referred by the President, with the Transportation Plan itself, to the military 
commanders.
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 The Chiefs of Staff considered that it was too late and (unlike the Foreign Office) had 
no wish to associate a Frenchman with plans entailing high French casualties. Churchill backed them, 
for a different reason: ‘a suggestion to de Gaulle of this kind would only give him another opportunity 
of obtruding himself.’
130
  
Whether de Gaulle himself could have made a difference is uncertain, because there is no 
evidence of his trying: neither speeches nor messages contain any but the most oblique allusions to 
bombing.
131
 To do more would have placed the General in one of two politically damaging positions: 
either unsuccessful supplicant or co-organiser of bombing. But Allied resistance to French involvement 
persisted even after the recognition of France’s Provisional Government in October. A protest from 
General Bouscat, Chief of the French Air Staff, against the bombing of rail targets in Strasbourg and 
Colmar and requesting that the Allies took specialist French advice, met a dismissive response: 
Tedder’s personal staff officer, Leslie Scarman, observed that ‘I do not like the proposal that we should 
inform the French that when necessary we should consult French Railway technicians, when in fact, we 
have no intention of doing so at all.’132 
Conclusion and postscript 
Like the wider bombing offensive, bombing policy towards France sought to achieve a succession of 
overlapping, divergent, or even contradictory objectives, determined by the progress of the war. 
Several consistencies can nevertheless be observed. First, except between April and September 1944, 
France was a secondary target to Germany. Second, because France was enemy-controlled, but not 
enemy, territory, the usefulness of bombing had to be balanced against the political objections 
attached to killing French civilians. Political control of bombing policy, sometimes extending to single 
raids, could therefore be much tighter than in the case of Germany. A frequently dismissive attitude to 
protests from Vichy and Free French alike should not obscure two facts: the unoccupied zone was off 
limits till November 1942, and the attacks on the Biscay ports in early 1943 were the only instance of 
area bombing against France. French victims were strictly collateral damage. Third, however, attacks 
  
on precise objectives, often in built-up areas, had been rejected in relation to Germany by 1942 in 
favour of area bombing, chiefly because the bombers were not accurate enough. Inevitably, therefore, 
many ‘precision’ raids on France, even against lighter defences, would destroy French lives and 
property without seriously damaging their targets. Fourth, though raids were more accurate by 1944, 
they were also far larger. The attacks on Caen and Le Havre both hit their designated targets; to their 
civilian victims, they nevertheless felt like area bombing. Fifth, while political concerns could at least 
delay raids against some targets, such as industry in 1941–42, they were invariably trumped when vital 
military interests were seen as at stake. This happened over the Biscay ports and the Transportation 
Plan, despite the uncertainty surrounding the effective military contribution of air raids. Sixth, the 
political objections to bombing were strongest before November 1942 because of the real (to British 
minds at least) danger that France’s fleet and North African empire would be handed to Germany. The 
removal of this threat certainly facilitated the brief switch to area bombing of the Biscay ports weeks 
after the Torch landings. The implicit danger of Vichy action before Torch was more effective than any 
number of Free French protests after. Nor, in the end, did fears of poor post-war relations with France 
weigh against the perceived military imperative of the Transportation Plan. A final point is that the 
policy problems presented by the bombing of France are more likely to recur in the contemporary 
world than those relating to Germany. An all-out conventional air war against a major military power 
has been all but unthinkable since 1945. On the other hand, bombing territory in order to liberate it, 
while attempting to limit collateral damage to civilians, is a continuing challenge to today’s strategists. 
The first acknowledgement of the sufferings of the French came from what might appear an 
unlikely source. On 23 September 1944 Sir Arthur Harris wrote to all commanders of bomber groups to 
open a subscription, capped at 1 shilling per donor, to assist French children whose parents had been 
shot for helping downed Allied bomber crews, or whose families had suffered from Allied bombing. 
The subscription raised £12,765, or FF2.553 million, in barely a month. This was, it is true, rather less 
than the cost of a single Lancaster. It was nevertheless received gratefully by Massigli and by France’s 
(Communist) Health Minister, François Billoux.133 
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